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NOTES ON GREEK HISTORY

by

H. T. F. DUCKWORTH, M.A.

Trinity College, Toronto

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Notes on the Reign

of

Darius, Son of Hystaspes.

B. C. 521-485.

B.C.

521 Darius becomes King: finds the Empire disorganized, rebellions breaking out in many provinces.

521-514 Wars of pacification.

519 Prophesying of Haggai and Zechariah in Jerusalem (Ezra. v. 1).

519 *June* Babylon recaptured after a siege lasting two years.

516 Restoration of the Temple in Jerusalem completed (Ezra. vi. 15).

Samos is added to the Persian Empire.

515-514 Second Babylonian revolt.

513 Persian dominion again extended to the Punjab (India).

Details of Darius' Organization of the Persian Empire.

1. Division of the Empire into satrapies.
2. Separation of civil and military authority, except in special cases of satrapies bordering on a dangerous enemy.
3. The government was centralized in the Sovereign,

like that of Turkey. All great offices of State were held during the King's pleasure.

4. Roads and posts connected the provincial seats of government with Susa (the summer capital) and Babylon (the winter capital).

5. Toleration of local varieties of law, religion, language.

6. A gold currency of great purity was issued—the celebrated "darics", coins of about the same weight as a British sovereign.

7. Fixed assessments of tribute imposed on the satrapies, but no systematic arrangements to provide for expenses of government. This left openings for extortion—a common complaint in Oriental monarchies.

8. The standing army was small—practically a military police. Very large, but also very heterogeneous armies (provincial levies en masse) were mustered when war broke out.

9. The naval service was performed by Phœnicians, Egyptians, Cyprians, Cilicians, and (excepting a period of about 100 years after Mycale) Greeks of Asia Minor.

Obs. on No. 5—The Persians more than once burned their enemies' temples (*e.g.* at Miletus in 494, Eretria in 490, Athens in 480) but they never attempted to suppress their religion. In dealing with the Greek cities subject to them, the Persian Kings naturally preferred to have their communities governed by despots, but they allowed other forms of government, so long as allegiance was kept. Wherever there were opposing political parties, the Persian had opportunities of maintaining his own ascendancy by playing off one party against the other.

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Good points of the Persian Imperial System.

1. Conquered territories were governed and administered, not merely exploited or plundered. The Persian religion commended reclaiming of waste land as a duty. Communication between various regions was in many cases improved.
2. Wars of people against people, city against city, tribe against tribe, within the Empire, were brought to an end.
3. The high character of the currency issued by the royal mint was a benefit to commerce.

Defects of the System.

1. Too much depended on the personal qualities of the Sovereign. Moral decline of the dynasty led to the downfall of the Empire.
2. There was supervision of the provincial governors and officials, but it was not extended to the point where it was most wanted—viz: taxation. There being no definite allowances for the expenses of government, officials were tempted to practise extortion.
3. Areas of unsubdued territory were left within the Empire—in the mountains of Asia Minor and Armenia, and even nearer to the royal residences in Susa and Persepolis.

513? Darius sends a small naval expedition to reconnoitre the coastlands of Greece. This expedition gets as far as Crotona in S. Italy.

513-512. Preparations for invasion of Europe, to secure the N. W. frontier of the Empire. Mandrocles, a Samian, constructs a pontoon-bridge, between Byzantium and the Black Sea end of the Bosporus—the exact locality not further ascertained.

512. Darius, at the head of a large army, crosses the Bosporus, and marches over the Balkans to the Danube. A fleet of 600 sail proceeds to the mouth of the Danube, enters the stream, and accends to the head of the Delta, awaiting the arrival of the army. Darius crosses the Danube. According to Ctesias, the Persian army penetrated 15 days' march beyond the river, and lost 80,000 men before it regained the Danube.

Revolt of Greek Cities in the Propontic region(*i. e.* on the shores of the Hellespont, Propontis, and Bosporus), which had received news of a disaster to the Persian arms in Scythia.

Darius returns to Asia by way of Sestos in the Thracian Chersonese, the Byzantines having destroyed the bridge on the Bosporus.

512, 511 and early months of 510. Darius remains in Sardis.

511. Megabazus subdues Perinthus and the Aegean coastland of Thrace. Byzantium and other Greek cities still defy the King.

Histiæus begins to fortify Myrcinus (on the Strymon) a place granted him by Darius. Myrcinus was an important point, (1) because it comanded the crossing of the Strymon, (2) because it was the gate of a trade-route connecting the N. coasts of the Aegean with central Europe, (3) because it lay near the gold-mines of Mt. Pangæus.

510. Megabazus becomes suspicious of Histiæus and reports his proceedings to the King. Histiæus is summoned to Sardis and bidden to accompany the King to Susa.

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Artaphernes, the King's brother, remains at Sardis as satrap of Lydia Otanes quells the insurrection of the Greek cities in the Propontic region, and captures the islands of Lemnos and Imbros.

Arrival of Hippias (dethroned despot of Athens) at Sigeum in the Troad; probably in the late autumn

Net results of military operations, B.C. 512-510.

(1) Submission—nominal rather than real—of the Thracian tribes inland between the Sea of Marmora and the Danube.

(2) Occupation of several places along the southern coast of Thrace, between the Chersonese and the Strymon.

(3) The King of Macedon had recognized the superior power and authority of the King of Persia. The land-route to Greece had thus been secured by actual conquest as far as the Strymon, and by Macedonian submission as far as Mt. Olympus.

510? Persian dominions in Africa extended westwards to Euhesperidæ (Bengazi).

507. Athenian envoys at Sardis, seeking Persian protection from Spartan aggression.

Events in Greece, 510-500.

510 Expulsion of Hippias and the rest of the Pisistratidæ. Return of the Alcmæonidæ.

508-507 Archonship of Isagoras. Cleisthenes proposes constitutional reforms (Botsford, pp. 80-84). Faction-fighting in Athens: Isagoras procures the intervention of Sparta in the olígarchic interest. Cleomenes (King of Sparta) sends a herald, bidding the Athenians expel "the ac-

cursed" (*i.e.* the Alcmæonidæ, because of the murder of Cylon. Botsford, pp. 45-46.), whereupon Cleisthenes and his partisans withdraw. Cleomenes enters Athens, seizes the Acropolis, and banishes 700 Athenian families hostile to Isagoras. The Athenians blockade Cleomenes in the Acropolis, and he is forced to capitulate after 2 days, having no food. He is allowed to retire, taking Isagoras with him. Return of Cleisthenes and the rest of those who had withdrawn or been banished. Cleisthenes' programme of reform is carried out.

507. The Athenian embassy at Sardis. Artaphernes, Satrap of Lydia, demands tokens of submission (earth and water). The envoys agree, but their action is repudiated by the people when they return to Athens.

506. Cleomenes attempts to avenge his defeat, but fails (Botsford, p. 84) being opposed by his colleague Demaratus and by the Corinthians.

The Athenians defeat the Thebans and the Chalcidians in battle and annex a large piece of Chalcidian territory (Chalcis, in Eubœa: see Botsford, p. 84 and map opposite p. 127.).

505. War breaks out between Athens and Aegina.

504? Sparta proposes to her allies the restoration of Hippias, but they refuse their support. Hippias begins to incite the Persians against Athens. A second Athenian embassy at Sardis, to establish peaceful relations between the Persian monarchy and Athens. Artaphernes refuses peace except on condition of Hippias' restoration, which the Athenians cannot agree to.

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500-493.....*The Ionian Revolt.*

500. Civil strife in Naxos; the aristocracy expelled by the people. The exiles seek the aid of Artaphernes through Aristagoras, vicegerent for Histiæus in Miletus. Aristagoras persuades Artaphernes to help the Naxian exiles. Naxos, he points out, will thus fall within the range of Persian power and serve as an advanced post for movement on Greece. (N—Artaphernes had already demanded that Hippias should be restored to Athens—not for Hippias' sake only, but in order that the Persian king might have a dependent and agent on the mainland of Greece). Artaphernes promises to muster a fleet of 200 sail.

499. (*Summer*) A Persian army, carried in an Ionian fleet, lands in Naxos and besieges the city, but the islanders, warned beforehand of their danger by *Aristagoras* (not by Megabates, the Persian commander), are ready for the siege. After four months' fruitless effort, the siege is raised.

(*Autumn*). The autumn finds the Ionian fleet still "in being" at Myus on the Mæander, though the land-forces have been disembarked and disbanded. Aristagoras has gained his object. A revolt may be set going, with a large fleet ready to operate along the coast.

The outbreak of rebellion is signalized by the arrest of several Greek despots, who are faithful to Persia, on board the fleet and the deposition of others in their cities.

(*winter*) Aristagoras visits Sparta and Athens, petitioning for assistance. No help is given by Sparta—probably because a war with Argos

is imminent. Athens promises to send ships and fighting-men the following spring.

498. (*spring*) Twenty Athenian and five Eretrian vessels cross the Aegean to Miletus, and there join an Ionian force which proceeds to Ephesus.

(*Summer*) The allies march upon Sardis, and capture the lower city, to which they set fire, but fail to take the citadel. They are compelled to abandon Sardis by the approach of a strong relieving army, and retreat to Ephesus, where they embark, but not without having to fight a "rear-guard action" in which they suffer some loss.

The Ionian fleet defeats a Phœnician fleet off the coast of Pamphylia (S. coast of Asia Minor.).

The Greek cities in Cyprus revolt.

(*autumn*) Byzantium and the Propontic Greek cities join the revolt.

(*winter*) Athens (probably because of danger threatening from Aegina) refuses to send any more help to the Ionians

Artaphernes forms his plan of campaign for next year. Three armies to be mustered for the reduction of (1) the Propontic region, (2) Aeolis, (3) Ionia.

497. (*spring*). Reduction of the revolted cities along the Hellespont and Propontis begins.

(*summer*). Caria joins the insurgents, but the Dorian cities on the Carian coast maintain their allegiance to Persia—at any rate give no help. A Persian army lands in Cyprus. Near Salamis (E. coast of Cyprus) a double encounter takes place—the Ionians against the Phœnicians by sea, the Cyprians against the Persians by land. By sea the insurgents are victorious,

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by land they suffer complete overthrow. The Ionian fleet leaves Cyprus to its fate.

(*autumn*) Persian victory on the river Marsyas in Caria. End of the revolt in Cyprus.

(*winter*) Aristagoras betakes himself to Thrace, intending to occupy Myrcinus, and is killed in battle with the Thracians.

496. (*summer*) Another Persian victory in Caria, at Labranda.

Histiæus obtains leave to come down to Ionia, and finds himself suspected by Artaphernes of being an accomplice of the insurgents.

Great Persian defeat in Caria, near Mylasa.

495. Histiæus escapes from Sardis and visits various centres of the rebellion—Miletus, Chios, Mytilene.

Both sides appear to refrain from active warfare this year, having fought each other to a standstill for the time being.

The Persian presumably set themselves to make up for heavy losses in Caria and the destruction (or at least crippling) of their fleet off Salamis (Cyprus). A new fleet under construction in the harbours of Phœnicia, Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt. There may also have been attempts at bribery and corruption on both sides, instead of fighting.

494. (*spring*) The Persian preparations complete. The land-forces converge on Miletus, and the new fleet blockades the place by sea.

(*summer*) Battle of Ladê. 600 Phœnician and ships against 353 Greek. Many Greek vessels desert. Complete Persian victory.

(*autumn*) Capture and sack of Miletus (Botsford p. 114).

Histiæus at Byzantium.

(*winter*) Persian forces rest, after sanguinary exploits of summer. Settlement of the Milesian captives at Ampê near the mouth of the Tigris.

493. (*spring*) Phrynichus' drama. "The Capture of Miletus" (Botsford, p. 115).

Histiæus is killed while raiding Atarneus in Aeolis

(*spring and summer*) Cruise of the Phœnician fleet in the Hellespont and Propontis, capturing and burning rebel cities—Perinthus, Selymbria, Byzantium, Chalcedon, Proconnesus, and others. Flight of Miltiades from the Chersonese, which he had ruled as despot for at least 20 years.

Pacification of Ionia and Aeolis by Artaphernes (Botsford, pp. 114-115.) Each city assessed for tribute according to the extent of its territory. Artaphernes' assessments were still in force sixty years later—*i. e.* in the case of those Greek cities of Asia which had not joined or been compelled to join, the Athenian League.

Mardonius in Thrace and Macedonia.

492. Mardonius leads an army over the Hellespont into Europe, and marches along the coast of Thrace, the fleet advancing simultaneously by sea and keeping abreast of him. Conquest of Thasos (gold-mines). Mardonius subdues the Brygi or Bryges, but his fleet is wrecked in a storm while rounding Mount Athos (Monte Santo). As the land-army depended to a great extent on the fleet for supplies of food, this disaster compelled Mardonius to turn back—otherwise, he would have pressed on into Thessaly. However Thrace and Macedonia had been recover-

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ed for Darius, and the way to Greece was open at least as far as the Thessalian border. Moreover, Thasos with its gold-mines had been added to the Persian Empire.

491. The disaster off Mt. Athos suggests to Darius the advisability of following a different method in attacking Greece. The plan of coöperation between an army and a fleet advancing round the N. Aegean was liable to be upset by the storms which not unfrequently arise in those waters. The direct route across the Aegean is therefore adopted. Furthermore, the new expedition is *in appearance* directed *only* against Athens and Eretria as an act of vengeance for the burning of Sardis in 498, an outrage in which Athenians and Eretrians had taken part. But there is also an ulterior purpose, viz.: to establish a "bridge-head" on the European side of the Aegean Sea, to facilitate subsequent onslaughts on Hellenic independence.

Despatch of heralds to various cities in Greece and the Islands demanding the tokens of submission (earth and water); object—to detach as many as possible from the defence, before the attack should take place. (The same device employed by Xerxes, 10 years later, before he invaded Greece).

Aegina offers to submit to the Persian king, out of enmity to Athens. Athens lays complaint at Sparta against Aegina. King Cleomenes compels Aegina to to give hostages as security of loyal behaviour. The hostages are sent to Athens.

The Expedition of Datis and Artaphernes.

490. (*spring and summer*). The Persian army destined to attempt the conquest of Attica musters at Susa, and marches to the Aleïan plain in Ci'icia. There it embarks and is conveyed by sea to Samos. From Samos the armada turns westward. The city of Naxos is attacked, taken, and burnt down. (Naxos had defeated the Persians in 499). On the other hand, Datis respects the sanctuary at Delos.

Other islands also are visited, and contingents from them join the Armada. The army lands at Carystos (S. end of Eubœa), which is compelled to submit by the devastation of its territory.

Siege is laid to Eretria. The town holds out for 6 days, but then is delivered by traitors into the hand of the enemy. The temples are burnt, and the population made slaves.

A few days later, the Persia army is carried across from Eubœa to Attica, and lands at Marathon, this point being selected on the advice of Hippias, the ex-tyrant of Athens, who accompanies the expedition in the hope of being restored to his dominion.

Notes on the Persian Armada.

1. *Datis*, who was a Median, probably collected from Media, Persia, and other Eastern regions of the Empire, the troops which came down from Susa to the Aleïan plain. He is always mentioned before Artaphernes, and therefore one concludes that he was the senior comander.
2. Artaphernes, son of Artaphernes (Satrap of Lydia) and nephew of Darius, probably had charge of the embarcation at the Aleïan Plain.

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3. Hippias would naturally join the expedition at Samos.

4. *Size of the Armada.* Cornelius Nepos (*Miltiades*, ch. 4-5) asserts that Darius raised a force of 500 ships, 200,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry, which he sent under command of Datis and Artaphernes to conquer Greece. In the *battle*, 100,000 Persian infrantry and 10,000 cavalry were drawn up in array to meet the Athenians and Platæans (whose numbers are estimated at 10,000). According to Pompeius Trogus, there were 600,000 Persians against 11,000 Greeks. Plato (Menexenus) repeats a story of 500,000 Persians and 300 ships of war, besides transports. The Greek orators of the 4th century speak in terms of cloudy exaggeration of the "myriads" defeated by the Athenians. Herodotus says that the Persian army was "numerous and well equipped," and that there were 600 ships of war, and horse-transports besides.

The 600 ships, he says, were ordered in the previous year from the maritime communities subject to Darius.

The number 600 is large, but not impossible. It may be the ordinary naval levy of the Empire. Compare the 600 ships supporting Darius' invasion of Europe, and the 600 ships in the Persian fleet at Ladê in 494.

But 600 even of the largest vessels then in use could not have carried more than 60,000 soldiers in addition to their crews. Besides, the *immediate* object of the expedition was only the conquest of Eretria and Athens, though as a step to further conquests.

It is not likely that the land forces commanded by Datis and Artaphernes numbered more than 40,000. And of this number, *not more than half* can have engaged the Athenians in the battle.

Note on Marathon.

The Plain of Marathon, where the battle was fought, is on the E. coast of Africa, about 24 miles by road from Athens, in a N.E. direction. It extends in length from N.E. to S.W. for about 4½ miles: in breadth, from the surrounding hills to the sea-line, 1½ to 2 miles. At either end there is a marsh. The marsh on the N., which is the larger, leaves between itself and the sea a long strip of ground where in all probability the Persians drew their ships on shore and encamped. In this position they could only be attacked at the W. end of their camp. The plain, now-a-days, is much overgrown with vines, and therefore dangerous to riders. If it was similarly overgrown in 490 B.C. the Persians would have been unable to use their cavalry, but if it was open their cavalry could easily have held in check any hostile force attempting to advance from the hills towards the shore. As a matter of fact, the Persian cavalry took no part in the battle.

The Greeks under Miltiades were encamped at the Heracleion, up among the hills, nearly 6 miles (by road) from the Persian position. It was to their advantage to engage the Persians in a hand-to-hand fight, in which the superiority of Greek weapons and armour could tell. They were safe enough so long as they held their position, but if they had retreated, they would

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have been pursued and overtaken by the more lightly equipped Persians, and perhaps surrounded by a host plying them with arrows and darts. The Persian army was much more dangerous to run away from than to close with. Herodotus speaks of the Athenians and Platæans charging on the Persians for a distance of nearly a mile "at a run"—*running* a mile in heavy armour and then fighting! This is a physical impossibility. The Athenians may have advanced at an unusual speed, but they can only have started to *run* when close up to the enemy.

The bay of Marathon was selected as the landing-place because (for one reason) the presence of the invaders there would naturally draw out a considerable force from Athens to watch them. Thus an important Athenian force would be kept away at a distance of 24 miles from Athens. Meanwhile, the friends of Persia within the walls could mature their design for delivering the city into the hand of the alien. As soon as everything was ready, the signal would be given. Datis would leave about half his army at Marathon to detain the Athenian army facing it, while he took the rest round by sea, to land at Phaleron and then take possession of Athens. The "pro-Persian" party in the city was led by the Alcmæonidæ, though they must have known that Hippias was with the Persians. Perhaps they had arranged matters with Hippias. Their object was to break the power of the aristocratic party, which was led by Miltiades. As for Hippias, many of the poorer sort might remember that

under the "tyrants" the "common folk" were more fortunate, on the whole, than under the régime of a nobility. Cleisthenes' reforms had not yet thoroughly "democratized" the state. The Persians, however, ruined their own scheme by burning the temples in Eretria. The smoke of the burning buildings going up to heaven, was plainly visible from the Attic shore of the Euripus, and the fate of Eretria made the mass of the democratic party distrustful of Persian good faith. They saw themselves marked down for slaughter and slavery, and rallied for the defence of the city under aristocratic leaders.

Events after the Persian landing at Marathon.

The landing may be dated (provisionally) about the first week in September, B.C. 490.

As soon as news of the landing reached Athens, an army of 9000 men, commanded by Callimachus (having Miltiades as one of his staff), was despatched to the Heracleion, near Marathon, to watch the invaders. A messenger was also sent to Sparta, to ask for help. The Spartans answered that they would come as soon as they had kept the festival of the full moon (probably the full moon of their great month Carneios).

The Persians waited day after day for the signal which should tell them that all was ready within the walls for their appearance without, but no signal came.

They could not wait indefinitely, as they knew that the Athenians must be getting reinforcements, which would arrive in a short time.

At last they decided to move on their own account. A strong force was drawn up on the shore to cover the embarcation of the main body intended for landing at Phaleron. This movement was of course reported to Callimachus by his scouts. The whole army at the Heracleion, therefore (9000 Athenians, 1000 Plataeans) advanced from the hills into the plain, to engage the Persian force which covered the embarcation.

At this moment, probably, came the shield-signal from the hills, meaning that all was ready for the Persians in Athens. The battle was stubbornly contested. In the end, the Athenians destroyed the troops opposed to them, but they were unable to stop the embarcation and departure of the rest.

The shield-signal had warned the Athenians that treachery was still at work. They therefore marched back to Athens with all the speed they could. Possibly they were back by the evening of the day of the battle. The Persian fleet, which had 90 miles to go (round Attica) and was loaded with troops, horses, and captives from Eretria, can hardly have made Phalerum before midnight, and even if they put in close to shore, they were well advised in not attempting to land. It was full moon at the time, and their movements would have been seen. Morning came, and with it, one infers, the apparition of the Athenian army in the Plain of Phaleron. The game was up. Datis gave the signal for retreat, and went back to Asia, having accomplished less than half the work appointed him by the king.

Losses in the Battle of Marathon—Persians, 6400 : Athenians, 192 (according to Herodotus).

The troops promised by Sparta arrived at Athens about 24 hours after the battle had been fought, and had to be content with a view of the Persian dead.

Results of Marathon.

1. A strong taint of suspicion clung to the Alcmæonidæ, though the accusation of treachery could never be brought home to them.
2. Miltiades, on whose advice Callimachus had acted (in holding on at the Heracleion), and who had devised the tactics employed in the battle (putting the strength of the attack on the wings), became the foremost man in Athens, for the time being, and his party (conservative and aristocratic) profited by this as long as his ascendancy lasted. The unlucky Paros expedition, however (Botsford, pp. 122-123), left Miltiades at the mercy of his political adversaries. They made unsparing use of their opportunity.
3. The reputation of Athens rose high. The Athenians could claim the honour of being the first Greeks who had defeated a Persian army in a pitched battle by land. At the same time, the actual victors of Marathon must have been aware that the Persian force destroyed at Marathon was *not* "an exceeding great army," and Miltiades (if no one else) would know well enough that the Great King's design of conquering Hellas had only suffered a temporary check.
4. Thebes was already hostile both to Athens and to Platæa. Marathon would add fuel to the

flame of hatred, for Thebes had played the part of Meroz, while the men of Athens and Platæa "jeoparded their lives unto the death upon the high places of the field."

490 or 489. Settlement of Eretrian captives at Ardericca, a royal domain in Cissia (modern Khuzistan, the region east of the lowest reaches of the Tigris).

[For similar instances of "transplantation," see II Kings, xv. 29, xvii. 6 and 24, xxiv. 14 and 16, xxv. 11, and the instance of the Milesian captives removed to Ampe. Darius also caused the Pæonians (on the Strymon) to be removed to Phrygia, but they contrived to return at the time of the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt. Large bodies of captives carried away by the Persians from Antioch in A.D. 540 and from Jerusalem in A.D. 614].

Note on the Shield-signal at Marathon.

The Persian fleet, when it left Marathon, set its course for Cape Sunium, the intention being to round the promontory, come up the west coast of Attica to Phaleron, the port of Athens, and effect a landing there before the Athenian army could return.

1. Herodotus represents this move as taking place after the battle.

2. He also says that rumour charged the Alcmæonidæ with having suggested it to the Persians, "for it was said that they, in accordance with a preconcerted arrangement, signalled with a shield to the Persians as soon as they (i.e. the Persians) were on board ship." That a signal was given by means of holding up a shield on

some elevated place (to act as a heliograph) Herodotus does not deny. But he will not allow that the Alcmæonidæ were guilty. He points out that the Alcmæonidæ were "haters of tyrants," and therefore could not have desired to put their country under the feet of the Persians and of Hippias. It was by the Alcmæonidæ that the deliverance of Athens from the house of Hippias had been bronght about.

With regard to 1.

Herodotus himself states that the battle lasted *a long time.*

It is not likely that it began before daylight, which at that time of the year would be between 5 and 6 a.m.

The engagement may be assumed to have been a "full morning's work." Let it be supposed, however, that it began soon after sunrise, *i.e.*, about 6 a.m., and went on till 10 a.m.

At 10 a.m., then, the Persian armada left Marathon. Herodotus says that it stopped at an islet in the Euripus, to pick up the Eretrian captives. It was a heavily-laden fleet, and could not have travelled at a high speed.

The distance by sea from Marathon to Phaleron is about 90 miles. To cover this distance, as much as 18 hours might be taken by a fleet loaded up with troops, horses, captives, etc., as the Persian fleet was. Eighteen hours from 10 a.m. would be 4 a.m. on the day following. The distance by land from Marathon to Athens is about 24 miles. The Athenians could have rested for some hours after the battle and have marched back to the city by

midnight. They would have had the moon to light them when night fell.

The Persian commanders could hardly have been unaware of all these things, and the conclusion is that if the Persian fleet did not leave Marathon till *after* the battle, no attempt to effect a surprise-landing at Phaleron would have been made. The fleet would have gone back to Asia without further delay. However, the following points may be taken as assured :

(1) A signal was given to the Persians by the display, on some height visible from Marathon Bay, of a polished shield which reflected the sun's rays. The sun must have been well up, then, when the signal was given.

(2) The shield-heliography was followed by the departure of the fleet, and the embarcation had already begun when it was given.

(3) The Persians *did* attempt a surprise at Phaleron, but came too late.

The Persians would not have attempted a surprise at all, unless they had started at an hour which at least brought a surprise at Phaleron within the range of possibility.

They must therefore have begun to embark in the small hours of the morning. Part of their force, probably, had never been encamped on shore—this would be especially likely in the case of the horsemen.

As soon as the morning light was strong enough, the Athenian scouts would be able to see and report the movement in the Persian camp. The report would bring the Athenians out, in the hope at least of crippling the invaders

before they could get clear of the land. The shield-heliograph may have been seen by them as they marched down from the Heracleion to the plain.

When they got down to the plain, the Athenians found a Persian force drawn up across their path, to cover the embarcation. This force they had to attack.

They were victorious, but the battle went on for a considerable time, and when at last it was over, the main body (at least) of the Persian armada had got clear away.

The Eretrian captives left in the islet Aegilia would be picked up by a detached squadron, whilst the rest passed on, making for Sunium.

The main body of the fleet may have got away as early as 7 a.m., and by not stopping at Aegilia there might be hope of getting into Phaleron bay by midnight. There they hoped to find their friends ready to assist the landing, and accompany them into the city. As for the Athenian army at Marathon, the hope of Datis and Artaphernes would be that the force they had left behind would make an end of it or at any rate inflict such a blow as would leave it powerless to take any further part in the conflict. They cannot have left Marathon in the knowledge that the covering army had been cut to pieces by the Athenians.

Callimachus and his army would be back in Athens by midnight. The Persian armada would then be not far off Phaleron. Probably they expected fire-signals, but seeing none, waited for the morning. Then they approached the shore, and saw indubitable signs of the return

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of the Athenian army from Marathon, and the utter defeat of their plan.

With regard to 2.

The Alcmæonidæ had bribed the oracle at Delphi into worrying Lacedæmon to subvert the throne of Hippias. But their quarrel with Hippias would mean that they hated him, not for being a tyrant, but because his father had broken their power over the community and driven them into exile. One of the clan had accepted, without scruple, the gold of an Oriental, i.e. a barbarian, king, even Crœsus, who completed the subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks to the power of Lydia. Cleisthenes in B.C. 508-507 "took the people into partnership." But that was because the aristocracy supported Isagoras—and the fall of Isagoras may be ascribed to the harshness he displayed when he was escorted into the city by Cleomenes and a Spartan army. At any rate, it need not be supposed that the Alcmæonidæ served the people "for nought" either then or at any other time. They became the leading democratic family because they could not become the leading aristocratic family.

The reforms carried by Cleisthenes did not destroy the influence of ancestry and land-ownership. Under Pisistratus and Hippias, the common folk had not been badly off. There was no fiscal oppression—nothing like the Eupatrid domination, to alleviate which Solon had resorted to the desperate measure of a general cancelling of all debts. After the departure of Hippias, Athens had to fight, first Thebes and Chalcis, and then Aegina. Thebes and Chalcis

were defeated, but Aegina gave a great dea
trouble. There was evidently a determi
effort made by the democratic faction in 4
after the unlucky expedition to Ephesus a
Sardis, which resulted in advocates of neutr
ity and peace, and even friendship with Pers
getting the direction of affairs into their hand
Phrynichus' tragedy, the "Fall of Miletus
produced in 493, a theatrical censure
the neutral Persophile policy, and therefore h
was fined. Miltiades, returning from th
Chersonese in 493, belonged to a family whic
had been disliked by Pisistratus and Hippias
He was, whimsically enough, made to stand
his trial on the charge of having been a tyrant
in the Chersonese. The charge was true
enough, but Miltiades' petty monarchy in the
Chersonese was no concern of the Athenians'.
On that occasion the famous story was invented
relating how Miltiades wanted to break down
the Danube bridge and let Darius perish in the
Scythian wilderness. That the Alcmæonidæ
were among the adversaries of Miltiades might
be inferred from the fact that Xanthippus,
who prosecuted him after the Parian fiasco,
was connected with that family by marriage,
his wife being niece to Cleisthenes the reformer.
Miltiades was acquitted on the charge of tyranny.
His presence in Athens no doubt helped the
Eupatridæ or aristocracy. But it was a
permanent source of danger to the whole
community. Miltiades, in the eyes of Darius,
was an escaped mutineer. So long as he
remained in Athens, there would be no hope of
arranging compensation for the burning of

Sardis. That vengeance would be sought for that insult, the more discerning among the Athenians could hardly doubt. There remained one chance—and that was to make up the quarrel with Hippias. If the Alcmæonidæ helped Hippias to come back, would he let them stay in Athens? Hippias might rule as Darius' vassal. That was no great matter. Persian suzerainty might not press very heavily on a subject community west of the Aegean. And even if it did, it would press on all alike. In any case, the aristocratic faction would once more be overthrown.

Thus, as we understand the history, reading between lines, the Alcmæonidæ conspired to put Hippias once more in possession of Athens, and accept the yoke of allegiance to the Persian king. It was the successful issue of *their* co-operation that Datis and Artaphernes waited for at Marathon.

But the plot was defeated by Datis and Artaphernes themselves. The burning of Eretria scared the vast majority of the disaffected into loyalty. The Alcmæonidæ would find themselves objects of suspicion. Whether they really had their scheme for the surrender of the Acropolis and the city complete by the time they gave the shield-signal to the Persians, or, finding themselves constantly watched, tried the fortune of precipitating the Persian advance upon Athens, one cannot tell for certain. The Alcmæonidæ themselves would not be likely to leave any "documents" which would incriminate them, but only from such documents could posterity have learned all the facts.

489 or 488. The expedition to Paros. Herodotus (
lowed by modern historians, viz., Botsfo
p. 123) asserts that Miltiades persuaded
Athenians to entrust him with the comma
of a fleet of 70 sail, without making kno
the object of the expedition. This is impro
able to the last degree—even more improbab
than the statement that Cleomenes assembl
the forces of the Peloponnesian League witho
declaring the purpose for which they were
take the field. (Botsford, p. 84). The Counc
of 500, if not the whole people, must hav
known what Miltiades intended to do with th
fleet in command of which he desired to b
placed.

The court in which Miltiades was tried and
condemned was probably the Ecclesia or
General Assembly of the Citizens, as in the
case of the commanders brought to trial after
the battle of Arginusæ (p. 235). If not the
whole Ecclesia, it would be a jury selected
from the Heliæa (p. 54). It is fairly evident
that there must have been a considerable
revulsion of feeling with regard to Miltiades,
many who were previously supporters becom-
ing his adversaries. The treatment Miltiades
met with reflects discredit upon the Athenians.
To suppose that they did not know whither
the expedition was bound is impossible and
absurd. His political opponents, of course,
rejoiced over his failure, and made use of it to
inflame against him those who had hitherto
been well-disposed on account of the great
part he had played in the victory at Mara-
thon. That Xanthippus and his partisans

B.C.

were so successful shows that great expectations of profit had rested on the expedition to Paros. But in this history the Athenians played Ahab to the Parian Naboth. Miltiades had to be their scape-goat. If indeed the covetous aggression upon Paros was of his advising and suggesting, he perhaps deserved his fate, but the Athenian people had their full measure of guilt, forasmuch as they hearkened unto evil counsel and entered upon a way that was not good.

(Mr. Botsford—p. 123—being an American, is bound to assume the function of *advocatus populi*, which in this case is very much the same as *advocatus diaboli*.)

487. Egypt revolts. This disturbance interrupts the preparations which Darius is making for another invasion of Greece.

485. Death of Darius. Accession of Xerxes.

489-485. For Athenian politics between the year of Marathon and the time of Darius' death, see Botsford, pp. 123-124. At the top of p. 124, it would probably be safer to read "aristocrats" for "republicans." The "victor of Marathon" was the ideal of the conservative and aristocratic party in Athens, two generations later, in the days of Aristophanes, and held up to admiration in contrast to the democratic type. Thus the condemnation of Miltiades would not be "another gain," but compensation for the failure of the attempt to get him condemned on a charge of tyranny (see p. 117).

Ostracism (p. 83) has been generally regarded as the invention of Cleisthenes, but it was

apparently not made use of for some 20 ye
after he carried through his reforms. T
first recorded instance is the ostracism
Hipparchus, a descendant of Pisistratus,
488. If Hippias had not accompanied t
Persians to Marathon, Hipparchus might ha
been allowed to remain in Athens. Oth
kinsmen or friends of Hippias were ostracize
in 487 and 486, the institution being so fa
employed solely against such as had bee
adherents of the despots. Among thes
"friends of the tyrants," the Aristotelia
treatise "On the Constitution of Athens"
reckons Megacles, son of Hippocrates, an Alc-
mæonid. Set this against the eagerness of
Herodotus to clear the Alcmæonidæ from the
imputation of treacherous intrigue with
Hippias and the Persians in B.C. 490. In 485,
Xanthippus, the enemy of Miltiades, was
ostracized. The ostracism of Xanthippus was
perhaps the result of a reconquest of influence
and power by the party of which Miltiades
had once been the leader.

The fact that there is no recorded instance of ostra-
cism earlier than 488, though Cleisthenes'
reforms had been initiated twenty years before,
suggests that possibly the institution was not
his device, but originated only a short time
before it was actually utilized. By that time
Cleisthenes in all probability had been gathered
to his fathers, for he was at least 60 when he
began his work of reform. The original
motive of those who instituted ostracism is
uncertain. It may have been fear and sus-
picion of surviving supporters of the tyranny,

or it may have been designed simply as a means of heading off the danger to be expected from the "præpotentia" of any individual in the citizen-community.

According to the Aristotelian treatise above referred to, Solon caused the archons to be taken by drawing lots (*κλήρωσις*), out of a number of persons previously elected (*αἱρετοί*). Cleisthenes substituted election for drawing lots (*αἵρεσις* for *κλήρωσις*) in the second stage of the process. In and after 487, the archons were again appointed by the combination of election and sortilege. The statement with regard to the year 487 and subsequent years may be accepted without reserve. It is doubtful, though, whether the change made in 487 was really a return to an older practice or an innovation. One point, however, may be taken as certain, viz.: that Callimachus, the Polemarchus in 490 (the year of Marathon) was chosen, elected (*αἱρεθείς*) out of a number previously chosen and elected (*προκριτοι, αἱρετοί*) by the people in their tribes.

Additional note upon the changes made by Cleisthenes.

In place of the 4 Ionic Tribes (which were *not* local divisions) and the 48 "Naucrariæ" (which were local divisions) Cleisthenes established 10 Attic Tribes, in each of which there were 3 groups called *Trittyes*, and in each *Trittys* or "riding" there was a varying number of *Demi* or "townships." This system of tribes, ridings and townships, included the whole citizen-population of Attica.

The tribes were named after heroes and famous men of Attica as follows: A hundred names were

collected, and submitted to the oracle
Delphi, which picked out ten.

The division of each tribe into three ridings w
connected with the geographical distributi
of the population into (1) *Parali*—"people
the sea coast," (2) *Pediæi*—"people of t
plains" (such as the Thrisian plain), and (
Diacrii—"people of the heights," "hig
landers," the inhabitants of the hills. Eac
tribe had a "trittys" or riding in each of th
regions (sea-coast, plains, hills) into whic
physical geography divides Attica.

Each "trittys" or riding consisted of township
The townships in each "trittys" lay together
but no two "trittyes" or ridings of any one
tribe were in juxtaposition.

Every tribe was thus represented in each of the
natural (geographical) divisions of Attica, and
every region of Attica was represented in each
tribe, by a *constant* number of ridings and
a *varying* number of townships.

The number of townships (demi, "demes") under
Cleisthenes is not known. Herodotus, who
expresses himself obscurely, is understood to
say that it was 100, viz.: 10 to each tribe.
There were 174 about B.C. 200, and from
various sources (historians, orators and inscrip-
tions) 182 names in all have been collected.
It might be said that if there were 174 in
B.C. 200, when Attica was *not* at the height
of prosperity, there might well be as many in
B.C. 500, when the country was certainly not
in a state of "depression."

B.C.

Names of 4 Ionic Tribes.

1. Aigikoreis, 2. Argadeis, 3. Geleontes, 4. Hopletes.

By the time of Herodotus, and probably long before, the real origin of these names had been utterly forgotten. One attempt to explain them was the fable that they were derived from the names of the four sons of Ion, the ancestor of the *Ionian* Greeks. Their real meaning is still unknown. ~~In all likelihood they originated with "totem-names," viz. the names of birds or beasts or trees regarded in prehistoric times as kinsfolk of human tribes.~~

Names of the 10 Attic Tribes.

1. Erechtheis, 2. Aegeis, 3. Pandionis, 4. Leontis, 5. Acamantis, 6. Oeneis, 7. Cecropis, 8. Hippothontis, 8. Aeant[illegible] 10. Antiochis.

Acamantis i.e. the tribe of Aias

Notes on the Athenian Empire and the Periclean Policy.

1. The Confederation of Delos. See Botsford, pp. 146, 151-2.

Note (1) The leadership was voluntarily offered to Athens.

(2) The Athenians accepted the offer, but not without ulterior views. From the beginning, they meant to turn the alliance into an empire.

(3) The Confederation was originally Ionian, but might include non-Ionians.

(4) The Athenians assumed the function of deciding which among the allies should contribute money, and which should give ships (and their crews) for the prosecution of a war of revenge upon the Persians.

(5) This war of revenge was the ostensib
"raison d'être" of the Confederation.

(6) The *Hellenotamiæ* or Receivers of Tribut
were *from the first*, Athenian officials.

(7) All the confederate states were theoreticall
"autonomous," but thos[e] which paid mone
instead of furnishing armaments becam
ipso facto "clients" or dependents o
Athens.

(8) The first assessments of tribute, amounting
in all to 460 talents (about $555,000), are
generally ascribed to Aristides.

(9) The temple of Apollo in Delos was the first
treasury of the Confederation, and the place
where synods of deputies were held.

(10) Synods could not be convened frequently—
probably not more than one or two met
during the whole time that the Confedera-
tion lasted—and inscriptions show that
from the year 454 B.C. onwards the treasury
was no longer in Delos, but in the Parthenon
at Athens.

2. *Conversion of the League or Confederation of Delos into the Athenian Empire.*

The causes of the change were (1) the superiority of Athens both in energy and resources, in the will and the means to rule, over every other member of the league, (2) the readiness of a number of the allies to commute active service for money-pa[y]ments. The Athenians displayed their determination to rule (1) in their treatment of states which attempted to secede—these were degraded to the rank of tributaries, if previously among the states which provided armaments, (2) by their encroachments upon the territory and the liberties of allies who

were already in the position of tributaries, putting garrisons in their cities, appropriating portions of their land for "cleruchies" (*i.e.*, Athenian settlements which were colonies in the Roman rather than the Greek manner of colonization—see Botsford, pp. 84, 170, 271) and usurping appellate jurisdiction for the popular supreme court in Athens (pp. 169, 170, 193). Thus Athens made use of the "hegemonia" or leadership in a manner never contemplated by the states which had offered it to her. The change, however, was inevitable, and after all it was not without its advantages (see p. 170).

3. *The Policy of Pericles.*

Pericles was the ruling spirit in Athens for over thirty years—B.C. 460-429. In his administration of public affairs, during the years when he was again and again elected *strategos* or "general" (p. 177), four leading principles may be discerned.

(1) *The payment of citizens for service to the state, and more particularly the payment of the jurors in the law-courts.*

Remuneration for state-services probably began soon after the reform of the constitution by Cleisthenes. One-tenth of the Council of 500, *i.e.*, the 50 members chosen by one of the 10 tribes had to be on duty *continuously* in Athens for one-tenth of the year. Citizens of the lower classes in the Solonian census could not give so much time without some compensation, and we find that the members of the Council had their meals at the public expense while in Athens. In connection with the revolution of B.C. 411, it is stated that the councillors received payment for attendance, over and above their meals. No

tradition, however, connects this extra payment with Pericles' name. Remuneration for military service may be traced as far back as 480, when the Areopagus encouraged the populace to migrate to Salamis by promising to pay the men for service aboard ship against Xerxes. In the course of the next 20 or 25 years the Athenian soldiers and sailors must have received some sort of rewards for their services, either in payments from the treasury, or in shares of spoil, or both. Pericles systematized a practice already known. Plutarch says that Pericles kept a fleet of 60 sail at sea for 8 months every year, and thereby provided a large number of Athenians, not only with maritime experience and training, but with subsistence as well. The payment of the heliastæ or jurymen was introduced by Pericles himself. The pay was small, and had no attraction for the energetic and ambitious. The consequence was that the interpretation of the laws (p. 174) the decision of cases involving ruin, banishment, or death, fell to courts consisting mainly of the aged, the infirm, and the indifferent. There were 6,000 of these jurymen (p. 174). Their pay was about 8 cents per diem, which would go a long way with a poor Athenian. ~~Thus Pericles always had 6,000 men practically in his pay, and was able to swing the Assembly, of which the heliastæ were all members.~~ Pericles, however, ought to be credited with a good motive. He probably thought that (a) as many citizens as possible ought to be interested in the administration of the law, and (b) that the best way to secure this lay through giving the heliastæ an incentive to take an active part in that administration. It

must be remembered that the jury-courts, after 460, had to do most of the work formerly done by the Areopagus, and that cases were brought, not only from Athens and Attica, but from the allied cities also. One result of giving the "dicasteria" (p. 173) so much appellate jurisdiction over allied cities was to give the populace a direct interest in maintaining the Empire. In Periclean Athens, Demos was imperialist (though he had no notion of imperial federation) and it was rather the "men of ancestry" who were "Little-Athenians." Another point to be remembered in connection with the law-courts at Athens is that there was no professional class of lawyers. "Every man his own lawyer," was the rule. The sophists and rhetoricians were run after because they could show people how to argue plausibly, and they were willing to instruct any one who would pay them their fees.

(2) *The outlay of public funds upon the adornment and improvement of the city.*

The expenditure proposed by Themistocles in 481 and 478* upon the construction of a great fleet and the fortification of the Piræus was expenditure upon necessary purposes, and the money spent was furnished by these who voted it. Under the Periclean régime, there was great expenditure upon construction of a character mainly ornamental, as well as upon defences, and the money came from the contributions of the allies. In this way the Parthenon and the Propylæa of the Acropolis were brought into being. But this use of the money

* These dates are conjectural, but they can hardly be wrong, if they *are* wrong, by more than one or two years.

of the allies was not strictly honest. That money was, in theory at least, levied for the common defence of Athens and her allies, by sea and by land, against the "Barbarian" (*i.e.*, the Persian) or any other enemy. The treasury had been removed from Delos to Athens on the plea that it would be safer there. But the manner in which the Athenians used the funds there accumulated made that plea justly suspected. Pericles' opponents in Athens charged him with improper use of the league funds. His reply was that Athens provided support and protection for her allies, and that so long as this was done, no complaint could be made. This however, was a mere evasion. It was upon the treasury of the league, filled with contributions relentlessly levied upon the dependent allies, that Pericles drew, not only for building the Parthenon and other great architectural works, but also for a number of other purposes, such as the payment of soldiers and sailors, the payment of arsenal-police at the Piræus, the payment of jurors and so forth. Pericles made Athens the wonder of the world, but the rapacious finance by which this result was attained demoralized the Athenians, alienated their allies, and prepared the downfall of their empire.

(3) *The formation of "cleruchies" or Athenian settlements.*

These settlements were founded for either or both of two purposes, (a) strengthening the control exercised by the ruling city over her allies, (b) relieving the poorer sort among the citizens of Athens.

The type of these settlements is found in the occupation of Salamis and of a large portion of Chalcidian territory, in times prior to the Persian War (see Botsford, pp. 50 and 84), and that of Scyros in 469.

In the course of some 25 years before the Peloponnesian War, Athenian settlements (so many outposts of Athenian sovereignty—like the Roman colonies in Italy, etc.), were planted in the following places:

(i) The Thracian Chersonese—1,000 settlers.
(ii) Eubœa—1,000 settlers.
(iii) Naxos—500 settlers.
(iv) Andros—250 settlers.
(v) Brea (in Thrace)—1,000 settlers.
(vi) Lemnos.
(vii) Imbros.
(viii) Sinope—600 settlers.
(ix) Amisos (Samsun on the Black Sea).
(x) Astacos (at the head of the Gulf of Ismid—Sea of Marmora).
(xi) Hestiæa (N. end of Eubœa)—2,000 settlers.*

Colonies of the regular Greek type (p. 39) were founded at Thurii (S. Italy) in B.C. 443, and Amphipolis (on the Strymon) in B.C. 437. Neither of these communities retained any strong sentiment of loyalty towards its metropolis,

* Settlers (cleruchi) had been placed in Scyros by Cimon, B.C. 469, after the expulsion by the Dolopian pirates. According to Duncker, there were 15,000 Athenians settled abroad in the cleruchies at the time of the Thirty Years' Truce (B.C. 445). These settlers remained members of the tribes and townships to which they belonged at home in Attica. Cleruchies in fact were "coloniæ civium Atheniensium"—compare the Roman term "coloniæ civium Romanorum." Holm thinks that the Roman colonies were actually modelled on the Athenian cleruchies.

though from the first they were on the footing of political equality. But Amphipolis seceded in B.C. 424, and Thurii gave but little assistance at the time of the Sicilian Expedition (B.C. 415-413).

4. *Peace with the Persian King and preparation for a struggle with Lacedæmon.*

As soon as the Aegean had been rendered virtually inaccessible to the Great King's navies, and his power over the maritime cities broken, the object for which the league of Delos had been formed had been attained, and the only discernible reason for keeping the league in existence was that Athens might profit by its means. By the time when Pericles came definitely to the front, the conversion of the Confederation into the Athenian Empire was a *fait accompli*. It only remained to secure the permanence of this result. This was done by removing the treasury to Athens and by establishing garrisons and settlements in various localities —principally along the route by which the grain-ships went and came from the wheat-country lying along the northern shore of the Black Sea. For the impending struggle with Lacedæmon, Pericles prepared by his system of state payments. The majority of the citizens had a very distinct, tangible interest in the maintenance of Athenian sovereignty over a multitude of islands and coasts in and around the Aegean, for that sovereignty meant power to levy contributions, whereby so many citizens were individually profited. Even in restricting the franchise to men of Athenian origin on the mother's as well as the father's side, Pericles was seeking the same end. By reducing the number of those who had full citizen-rights he enhanced the

prestige and value of those rights, and by requiring Athenian parentage on both sides he presented pure Athenian descent as a circumstance conferring of itself distinction and superiority. By adorning the city with master-pieces of architecture and sculpture, making it "a thing of beauty" and "a joy for ever," he roused afresh the fire of Athenian patriotism. He sought to make the Athenians proud of themselves and their city, and proud in such wise as to be willing to fight to the last for their privileged and unique position among the cities of Hellas.

For architecture and sculpture in Athens under Pericles, see Botsford, pp. 179-185. Note also the quotation from Pericles' famous Funeral Oration, on p. 187.

5. The impending struggle with Lacedaemon. Not to conceal the design of Pericles as freedom known by merchants & financiers in Athens - The sight of means & evil deeds makes ill deeds done. The maritime power of Athens might - so some thought - be used for the conquest of the Commerce of the Greek world. This design was in view when the Athenians, about 456 B.C. procured places on the Gulf of Corinth to enlist its alliance, and the Sicilian Expedition of 415 was simply the maturing of that design. Athens, under the influence of Pericles, impelled on his term by the intrigues of rivals, really brought on the Peloponnesian War, though Lacedaemon made the declaration of war. The Athenians rather

Progress of Events From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Peace of Antalcidas.

B.C.

405. *September.* Lysander captures the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami (Botsford, pp. 235-236).

September-November. Lysander establishes Spartan garrisons and oligarchic governments in Byzantium, Chalcedon, Mytilene, Thasos, and other places which had been in alliance with Athens.

November. The Peloponnesian forces under Pausanias and Lysander besiege Athens and the Piræus.

404. *April.* The Athenians surrender, under pressure of famine. Hard conditions of peace (p. 237).

(Summer). Intimidated by the presence of Lysander and Lacedæmonian armed forces, naval and military, the Athenian assembly agrees to the institution of a Council of 30 for the ostensible purpose of drawing up a code of laws and carrying on the administration of the state until that task shall have been finished. This Council, consisting of fierce anti-democrats, and many of them newly-returned exiles, became known afterwards as the Thirty Tyrants. Prominent among them were *Critias* (a disciple of Socrates and uncle of Plato) and *Theramenes.*

404-403. *Summer of 404 to Spring of 403.* The Reign of Terror in Athens (see pp. 252-253). Theramenes, endeavouring to check the bloodthirsty madness of Critias, himself falls a victim.

(early spring). Athenian exiles gather at Phyle on Mt. Parnes, under the leadership of Thrasybulus.

B.C.

(*spring*). Thrasybulus captures the Piræus. The oligarchs attack him there and are defeated, Critias meeting his death in the battle. Most of the 30 "Tyrants" withdraw to Eleusis, leaving a council of 10 in their place. The democrats in the Piræus receive large supplies of money from Lysias the orator, and from friends in Elis and Bœotia. Envoys from the 30 at Eleusis and the 10 in Athens proceed to Sparta. Lysander procures for the oligarchs a loan of 100 talents, and his own appointment as commander of an army to march upon Athens. His brother Libys is sent to co-operate by sea. Blockade of the Piræus, and consequent distress of Thrasybulus and his followers.

Meanwhile suspicions of Lysander made themselves felt in Sparta. He had made himself too great and conspicuous. The kings and the ephors
403. were quite in the shade. King Pausanias accordingly got himself appointed, by the support of 3 out of the 5 ephors, to supersede Lysander in command of the campaign in Attica. Having called out the forces of the Peloponnesian League (the summons was disregarded by Thebes and Corinth) he marched into Attica and took over the chief command. Some fighting took place between Pausanias' troops and those of Thrasybulus, ending in a victory for the former. Pausanias then sent secret messages to encourage the democrats both in the city and in the Piræus. An armistice was concluded, and the settlement of the situation referred to Lacedæmon. The Spartan authorities sent 15 commissioners to pacify

Athens, and it was at length settled that all parties should keep the peace, that all property should be returned to lawful owners, whether democrats or oligarchs, and that there should be a general amnesty, the 30 and the 10 governors of the Piræus established by Lysander being excepted.

Summer. Euclides, first "archon eponymos" since the year of Aegospotami. Important events of Euclides' archonship (403-402)—(1) Revision of the laws ordered; this work took at least two years to accomplish—(2) Introduction into *official* use of the Ionic alphabet of 24 letters instead of the old Attic alphabet of 18 —(3) Restriction of Athenian franchise to persons of Athenian parentage on *both* sides (*i.e.*, Pericles' law of 451 re-enacted).

N. The return of the oligarchical exiles had been followed by a Reign of Terror—1500 persons are said to have been put to death in eight months. The democratic Restoration was followed by no such scenes. In every way, the democrats showed themselves better men than their opponents, who arrogantly called themselves "the best," "the noble and good," and so forth. No doubt some, at least, among the oligarchical party might have been unjustly sent into exile—but nothing had taken place to warrant the atrocities perpetrated under the misrule of Critias and his associates. On the other hand, the democrats might have been excused for taking a full measure of vengeance upon the faction which had laid the honour of Athens in the dust. Both in 411 and in 403, the Athenian democracy justified itself by

B.C.

moderation. In 403, the democrats undertook to repay Sparta the 100 talents which had been lent, at Lysander's instigation, to the oligarchs, though they were under no obligation to assume this debt. Evidently they thought 100 talents not too much to pay for the privilege of keeping up the credit of the Athenian State.

Some credit, at the same time, is due, in connection with the restoration of the democracy at Athens, to King Pausanias and the Lacedæmonian commissioners. It may be said that their prime motive was dislike for Lysander. But they did well to dislike him, for there was only one person to whom Lysander was ever loyal, and that was himself. His treatment of Athens had been atrocious, and all his proceedings since Aegospotami had brought his country into disrepute. Pausanias and his associates deserve some measure of applause for bringing about the pacification of Athens. It was at any rate an attempt to redress the evil wrought by Lysander.

The "year of anarchy" as the Athenians justly called the twelve-month beginning in July, 404 (inasmuch as there was no "archon-eponymos" for it in their records), was a year of civil war. From that ordeal the democracy emerged with honour. "Civil wars strike deepest of all into the manners of the people. They vitiate their politics: they corrupt their morals; they prevent even the natural taste and relish of equity and justice." (Burke: *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*). As for the sequel, it must be admitted that Athens in the

4th century was much less considerable than Athens in the 5th, yet even so it was the best-governed, most refined and enlightened, most humane community in the Hellenic world. It was still "the school of Hellas." The rapidity of growth and development, however, in the "heroic age" which began with the reforms of Cleisthenes and reached its height in the days of Pericles, issued in premature exhaustion. The refinement of the Athenian type was maintained, but it never regained the vigour which distinguished it in its imperial days.

402-401. Lysander gets himself sent with a fleet to the Hellespont, but after a while is recalled in consequence of complaints made by Pharnabazus, satrap of the Hellespontine region, who was an ally of Sparta.

401-400. Sparta chastises the Eleans by raiding and devastating their territory, as a warning to those of her allies (esp. Thebes and Corinth) who were disaffected on account of Spartan covetousness in appropriating all the spoils and profits of the victory over Athens.

401-400. Cyrus, satrap of Lydia, marches with an army into Babylonia, with intent to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes. Xenophon and the Ten Thousand (pp. 261-262).

399. Trial and death of Socrates. (See pp. 223-226). Reasons why this prophet was without honour in his own country:

(1) He was a sharp critic of democracy, though he never affected the manners of an aristocrat or oligarch.

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(2) He made many personal enemies by exposing their ignorance—an amusement in which he seems to have been excessively self-indulgent.

(3) The fact that such men as *Alcibiades* and *Critias* had been among his disciples was enough to stir up suspicion that he was a "corrupter of youth."

(4) He was a destructive critic rather than a constructive teacher, and a number of people feared (and not without reason) that his disintegrating methods of enquiry and analysis would be applied with fatal effect to long-established principles of religion and morality.

Xenophon's "Memoirs" certainly rescue Socrates from the imputation of being a mere "sophist" or twister of arguments, whose one aim and object was, as Holm puts it, "Effekt zu machen." But Socrates certainly contrived to make himself grievously misunderstood, and to a great extent this was his own fault. He was abstemious, it seems, without being cleanly. He was no advocate either of oligarchy or of despotism—yet he censured democracy. He frequented the temples and altars of the gods, and yet was suspected of secretly deriding them. In his unkempt asceticism he resembled the priests of Zeus at Dodona and the "philosophers" of the Cynic school, whose tradition was maintained in Christendom by the hermits and pillar-saints, and even by the cœnobites. In his destructive criticism, he is not unlike the Tolstoian anarchist of the present day. Among the Doukhobors he might, if brought back to earth, feel himself quite at ease.

399. Death of Agis. Accession of Agesilaus, younger brother of Agis, through an intrigue of Lysander, who caused doubt to fall upon the legitimacy of Leotychides, who had been heir-apparent to Agis.

Agesilaus was forty years of age when he became king. Little or nothing had been heard of him before. In the course of the next 38 years he was one of the most notable men in Greece. (A striking exception to Dr. Osler's law. Another is Julius Cæsar).

Position of Affairs in Sparta in 399.

1. The power of the kings was limited by (a) the ephors, (b) the navarchus or "Lord High Admiral." Ephors accompanied the kings when they took the field (*e.g.*, two ephors with Pausanias at Athens in 403) and the navarchus was practically a third king. The Spartan State was an oligarchy, with the ephors as its executive. Between the kings and the ephors there was constant opposition. Agesilaus, however, "cultivated" the ephors, and thereby greatly added to his own power.
2. Spartiatæ or Spartans properly so called, were a divided household. There was disaffection between the *Homoioi* or "Peers" who retained the full franchise, being able to contribute their quota to the Syssitia or public tables, and the *Hypomeiones* or "Inferiors" who had lost the full franchise through inability to contribute to the Syssitia. The *Homoioi* were the less numerous of the two parties. Since the year 412, a great deal of money, far more than the Spartans were accustomed to, had found its way into Sparta—mainly from Persian

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sources, and through the agency of Lysander. Result, a general rise in prices. Moreover, individual Spartans had enriched themselves abroad (Lysander an honourable exception), and this brought about inequalities between Spartan and Spartan. Laconia had not suffered much, if at all, in the war, but military operations tended to reduce the population—Spartiatæ as well as others—rather faster than the birth-rate could keep it up. The change in prices had operated disastrously on many fortunes, resulting in impoverishment, inability to maintain contributions to the Syssitia, and consequent loss of franchise. Citizen-rights in full, then, were now held only by a comparatively few wealthy or well-to-do, while a number of impoverished men, in all other respects the equals of their more fortunate or more covetous compatriots, were disfranchised and discontented.* Matters were not improved by admitting Periœci and Helots who had distinguished themselves under Brasidas and other commanders, into the class of *Hypomeiones* or "Inferiors," for this only increased the numbers of the *Hypomeiones* and emphasized their political inferiority to the *Homoioi* or minority of "Peers."

3. "Spartan simplicity" was falling into disrepute among the ruling *Homoioi*. Agesilaus set a good example of living up to the institutions of Lycurgus. But a good many Spartiates seem to have circumvented the requirements of those institutions. They took their black broth in

*The impoverished Spartiatæ would be liable to loss of (in Roman parlance) "jus honorum," if not of "jus suffragii."

public, but feasted sumptuously in houses of their own. Avarice was inflamed by the sudden influx of silver and gold into a community where money of any kind had always been scarce, and this passion seized not only the men, but the women also—and women were a great power in Sparta.

4. There was the long-standing mutual dislike between Spartan and Helot. The Helot hated the Spartan. The Spartan affected to despise the Helot, but inwardly feared him, and organized a special police (the Crypteia) to watch and secretly make away with any Helots who seemed likely to become dangerous. In the year of Agesilaus' accession, one of these secret police-agents, named Cinadon, who belonged to the class of *Hypomeiones*, turned against his employers, and used his knowledge and experience to evade all surveillance while he formed a great conspiracy of disaffected and discontented Spartans, Perioeci and Helots. But in his turn Cinadon was treacherously dealt with. Information was given to the ephors (though it was asserted that the gods had already given warning in the entrails of victims) and Cinadon was arrested. The names of his chief associates were extorted from him, and they were all put to death.

Cinadon's arrest brought to light the disaffection of the Hypomeiones. To disaffection among Perioeci and Helots the ephors were already accustomed, but general disaffection among Spartiates was a new thing. The governing authorities felt that a "politique d'éblouissement," in other words, warfare abroad, must

be the remedy for the uneasy and dangerous state of the internal affairs of Lacedæmon.

399. The dangers revealed by Cinadon's conspiracy, therefore, were one cause impelling the Spartan government to a "brilliant foreign policy." Others were—1. *Ill-feeling on the part of the Persian King towards Sparta*, in consequence of the friendship which had existed between Sparta and Cyrus. Spartan soldiers had taken their share in Cyrus' expedition, which was designed to dethrone Artaxerxes, the reigning monarch. 2. *The proceedings of Tissaphernes, satrap of Lydia, against the Greek cities of Asia.* He was beginning to "enslave" them —*i.e.*, re-establish Persian sovereignty over them. They appealed for aid to Sparta. By intervening in their defence, Sparta might regain some of the reputation lost in consequence of the tyrannous practices of the harmosts and decarchies. 3. *The discovery of the inner weakness of the Persian Empire by the escape of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand.* A hundred years earlier, no Spartan commander would have thought of attempting to march up from the coast to Susa. Such an enterprise seemed quite feasible to Agesilaus.

In 399, then, Thimbron was despatched to Asia, and captured some places in Lydia. His achievements, however, did not satisfy the ephors, and he was recalled, Dercyllidas being sent out in his place. Dercyllidas made a truce with Tissaphernes, while he attacked the province of Pharnabazus, satrap of Dascylium or the Hellespontine region (N. W. Asia Minor),

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Note the want of co-operation between the two satraps. They were mutually jealous, and the king exercised no control over their private animosities.*

398. Dercyllidas builds a wall across the neck of the Thracian Chersonese, to keep out the inland barbarians.†

397. Dercyllidas takes Atarneus, opposite Lesbos.

396. Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes combine at last against Dercyllidas, who is obliged to make a truce.

The Persian King grants Pharnabazus 500 talents for the equipment of a fleet in the harbours of Phœnicia, to be put under command of *Conon*, who was then in Cyprus, whither he fled from Aegospotami in 405.

Agesilaus, on the news of the Persian preparations reaching Sparta, proposes an invasion of Asia, with himself in command. An army of 8,000 (2,000 Lacedæmonians and 6,000 allies) is assigned to him. Athens, Corinth, and Thebes refused for various reasons to take part in the enterprise.

Agesilaus was accompanied by Lysander, who hoped to restore the decarchies as instruments of his own power and influence.

The Spartan king thought of nothing less than the overthrow of the Persian Empire.

Agesilaus proceeds by the way of Aulis (where the Thebans prevent him from offering sacrifice) to

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*Artaxerxes may have been prevented by some disturbance (invasion or rebellion) in the Far East of his dominions—or he may simply have been too indolent to interpose between his contentious viceroys.

†Walls had been built across the neck of the peninsula by Miltiades in the 6th century B.C., and Pericles in the 5th.

Ephesus.* After landing in Asia, Agesilaus finds himself eclipsed, in the esteem of the Ionians, by Lysander. Disagreeable incidents end in the despatch of Lysander to the Hellespont. Tissaphernes breaks truce, and Agesilaus begins military operations, giving first attention to the province of Pharnabazus, which he plunders.

395. Agesilaus devastates Lydia and defeats a Persian force near Sardis.

Tissaphernes having shown himself incompetent and cowardly, Artaxerxes sends Tithraustes to supersede him. Arrest and decapitation of Tissaphernes at Colossæ.

Tithraustes makes a truce with Agesilaus for 6 months, pending discussion at Sparta of the satrap's offer to grant autonomy to the Greek cites on condition of payment of fixed tribute to the Persian king. He also gives Agesilaus 30 talents, subsidizing him for an attack upon Pharnabazus.

Agesilaus (authorized by the ephors) musters a fleet of 120 sail and puts Pisander in command.

Invasion of N. W. Asia Minor by Agesilaus. The Lacedæmonian army penetrates as far as Paphlagonia (Euxine coast). Agesilaus winters in Pharnabazus' palace at Dascylium. Conference between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, who upbraids Lacedæmon for ill-treatment of a faithful ally—a very just reproof. Agesilaus undertakes to evacuate Pharnabazus' province.

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* Agesilaus' reason for embarking at Aulis was that he regarded himself as the successor of Agamemnon. There was a tradition connecting Agamemnon with Amyclæ, a place near Sparta, and Zeus was worshipped in Laconia under the name of Zeus Agamemnon.

The Lacedæmonian army withdraws into Mysia. There Agesilaus receives a message of recall, Sparta being in danger.

Naval events, B.C. 395. Conon advancing along the S. coast of Asia with 40 ships, meets a Lacedæmonian fleet of 120, which blockades him at Caunus. Reinforcements come to Conon, and the enemy retires to Rhodes, but is forced to withdraw by a democratic insurrection. Conon makes Rhodes his headquarters and captures a corn-fleet bound from Egypt for the Peloponnesus. Trouble in Conon's fleet in consequence of jealousies between officers and mutinous spirit among the men, whose pay was in arrear. Conon proceeds to Susa, and obtains the appointment of Pharnabazus as his colleague in command of the fleet. This arrangement proved successful, as it put Greeks under Conon's command, Orientals under that of the satrap.

394. Conon defeats Pisander off Cnidus. Death of Pisander. End of Lacedæmonian mastery of the sea.

396-395. The situation in Greece. Sparta in great disfavour; the tyrannous decarchies and the devastation of Elis had made the Lacedæmonian name hateful. Thebes and Corinth were openly disaffected and indeed hostile, especially the former. The Thebans had (1) assisted Thrasybulus and the exiled democrats against the Thirty (2) had refused contingents to the expedition of Agesilaus, and (3) had forcibly prevented Agesilaus from sacrificing, like Agamemnon, at Aulis. They were also irritated by Lacedæmonian intervention in Thessalian

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affairs, and the occupation of Heraclea Trachinia near Thermopylæ.

Tithraustes sends 50 talents by the hand of Timocrates, a Rhodian, to subsidize Argos, Corinth and Thebes against Lacedæmon.

395. The Bœotian War, beginning with Theban intervention in a dispute between Phocis and the Locri Opuntii. Phocis appeals to Lacedæmon, and with success.

The Lacedæmonian plan of campaign—Lysander to operate from Heraclea Trachinia; Pausanias to enter Bœotia from the south, and join hands with Lysander at Haliartus (between Mt. Helicon and Lake Copaïs). Lysander, arriving first, attacks Haliartus and is killed in the fight. Pausanias arrives next day and holds a council of war. A truce is made; Pausanias agrees to retreat at once. Being accused, on his return, of having betrayed the honour of Sparta, he withdraws into voluntary exile at Tegea.

Formation of an Anti-Lacedæmonian League—Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Argos, Eubœa, Acarnania, Ambracia, Leucas, the Malians, the Locrians, and most of Thessaly. Headquarters of the league at Corinth. [Recall of Agesilaus about this time].

The Corinthian War. The Theban Ismenias captures Heraclea Trachinia.

394. *Council of War at Corinth.* The allies decide to march on Sparta, but are anticipated by aristodemus (guardian of Agesipolis, son of Pausanias) advancing towards Corinth.

Battle before Corinth: Spartan victory, but with no great after-effects.

Agesilaus meanwhile advancing by land from the Hellespont.

Battle of Cnidus: death of Pisander—news reaches Agesilaus at Chæronea. General expulsion of Spartan officers and garrisons from the cities and islands of the Aegean. The Greek cities of Asia submit to Pharnabazus on condition of being left free in their internal affairs. Only Sestos and Abydos (Hellespont) continue to hold out for Sparta.

Battle of Coronea. Agesilaus, advancing through Bœotia, encounters an army of Bœotians, Athenians, Argives and Corinthians. Victory remains with Agesilaus, but the honours of the day with the Thebans, who, having become separated from their allies, cut their way through the whole Lacedæmonian army to rejoin them.

Agesilaus dedicates 100 talents ($\frac{1}{10}$ of his Asiatic spoils) at Delphi.

393. Conon and Pharnabazus with their naval armament ravage the coast-lands of Laconia and Messenia. Cythera occupied by an Athenian garrison. The satrap visits the allied head-quarters at Corinth, leaves a subsidy, and returns to Asia. Conon proceeds to Athens with 80 ships.

Rebuilding of the Long Walls connecting the Piræus with Athens.

392. Dissensions in Corinth—a peace-party (oligarchs) against a war-party (democrats). Massacre of oligarchs by democrats. Close alliance, tantamount to amalgamation, of Corinth with Argos. The oligarchs admit the Spartans within the walls connecting Corinth with its

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western harbour, Lechæum, and enable the Spartans to enter the territory north of the Isthmus.

391. Agesilaus and Teleutias capture Lechæum and the Corinthian magazines at Piræum. The Athenian commander Iphicrates and his peltastæ* cut to pieces a Spartan regiment (*mora*) of 600 men. Peace negotiations just opened are then broken off. Agesilaus returns to Sparta. Devastation of Acarnania by a Lacedæmonian army under Agesilaus.

390. Acarnania, dreading another invasion, enters the Lacedæmonian League.

Agesipolis, colleague of Agesilaus, ravages the territory of Argos.

The Peace of Antalcidas.

392. As Persian subsidies had encouraged Thebes, Argos, and Corinth to make ready for war with Sparta, furnished the armada which under Conon and Pharnabazus made an end of Spartan lordship over the Aegean, given the Corinthians a fleet, and enabled the Athenians to rebuild their Long Walls, Sparta thought it time to regain access to Persian liberality for herself. She had learned, while in alliance with Cyrus (B.C. 407-401) how useful Persian gold might be when placed at her disposal, and the events of the last two years had shown how formidable a power it was when put at the disposal of her enemies. Mission of Antalcidas to Sardis. Tiribazus, the satrap, a new

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* Peltastæ—so called from the light Thracian shield of leather (pelta) which was their chief piece of defensive armour. But though their defensive armour was lighter than that of the ordinary foot-soldier, their weapons of offence (swords and spears) were longer and more effective.

arrival, was easily influenced by Antalcidas, a man of craft like Lysander. Antalcidas proposed that the Greek cities in Asia should be made over to the Persian King, on condition that all the islands and the other cities of Greece should be left entirely independent and self-governing.

Thus Sparta "went back upon" her championship of Greek liberties in Asia, assumed in 396.

Meaning of Antalcidas' proposals regarding Greece itself:

1. *The Peloponnesus.* Sparta's allies in this region (and elsewhere, *e.g.*; Acarnania) were independent *in name*; Sparta would see to it that the name remained a name only.
2. *Argos.* The Argives would be compelled to dissolve their alliance or federation with Corinth.
3. *Thebes.* The Thebans would have to give up their suzerainty over other Bœotian cities.
4. *Athens.* The Athenians would have to give up all hope of regaining a maritime empire and might even lose Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros.

391. Counter-embassies from Argos, Athens, Corinth and Thebes, at Sardis. Arrest and disappearance of Conon.

Tiribazus refers the Spartan offer to Artaxerxes.

390. Recall of Tiribazus. Fighting between Lacedæmonian troops and those of Strouthas (Tiribazus' successor) in Ionia—Lacedæmonian defeat.

389. Thrasybulus wins over Byzantium and Chalcedon to alliance with Athens, and cruises along the

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coast of Asia to Aspendus, where he is assassinated.

388. Defeat of a Lacedæmonian force near Abydos by Iphicrates—death of the Spartan governor of Abydos.

Surprise-attack on the Piræus by Teleutias.

387. *Second Mission of Antalcidas.* Tiribazus in favour again, Artaxerxes having come round to the opinion that it was more profitable to help than to oppose Lacedæmon. Moreover, there were revolts in Cyprus and Egypt, and the King wanted to be free of the Greek distractions. Athens was assisting Evagoras against the Persians in Cyprus. Antalcidas therefore had no difficulty in getting the king's consent to his proposals. All that now remained was to induce Athens to "stand in." This was accomplished by dint of bribery, intimidation, and the promise that if Athens would recall her forces from Cyprus, she would be left in possession of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros.

Antalcidas now came down from Susa to the Hellespont and collected a fleet of 80 sail, thus giving Lacedæmon once more some command of the sea.

Causes disposing the Greeks to peace:

1. *Sparta* was tired of the fruitless Corinthian War. The terms proposed by Antalcidas meant the break-up of hostile confederations and alliances.
2. *Athens* was in difficulty with an exhausted treasury, and the interruption of grain-supplies from the Euxine by Antalcidas, whose fleet commanded the Propontic waters. Pirates

from Aegina were also a great plague.* Further, Athens stood to gain Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros by the peace.

3. *Argos* had suffered greatly from repeated devastation of her territory by Lacedæmonian armies.

4. *Corinth* had been in a state of siege for eight years.

5. *Thebes.* There was not much to make the Thebans peacefully disposed, but they would not care to stand out alone when their allies were ready to make peace.

Tiribazus now convened representatives of the Greek cities at Sardis.

Proclamation of the Persian King's good pleasure to the Greek envoys:

"King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, and, among the islands, Clazomenæ† and Cyprus; but that all the other Hellenic cities, small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and that these, as of old, should belong to the Athenians. And upon those states which do not accept this peace I

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* The Athenians of an earlier age, when the Aeginetans were a great naval power (*i.e.*, about 500 B.C.), called Aegina "the eyesore of the Piræus." In the 12th century of the Christian Era it was again haunted by pirates—some Saracens, others Genoese—who harried the coast of Attica.

† Clazomenæ, like Tyre, was built partly upon an island, lying close inshore on the south side of the Gulf of Smyrna, partly upon the mainland. The island was united with the mainland under Alexander the the Great, by means of a great mole or causeway.

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myself will make war, in conjunction with those who assent to these terms, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money."

With these terms to announce, the envoys returned to to their cities, whence they had come forth. The terms were accepted everywhere without opposition, except at Thebes, and the difficulty in the case of Thebes was simply that her authorities claimed the right to take the oath to observe the peace in the name, not of Thebes only, but of all Bœotia. This claim, however, was disallowed. Sparta threatened war, and Thebes "backed down."

Notice the following points:

1. Each of the "high contracting parties" (viz.: Persia and Lacedæmon) had rendered great service to the other, while seeking only its own interests. The enslavement of the Greek to the Persian in Asia was the price paid for the enslavement of Greek to Greek in Europe.

2. The Persian King was enabled, by the action of Lacedæmon, to pose as the recognized suzerain of all Hellas. Through Tiribazus, he ordered Greek envoys to come and hear on what terms they might have peace. They came, they listened to the reading of the royal mandate, and then departed, over-awed by the autocrat's menaces.

3. The first article of the Peace, abandoning all the Greek cities in Asia to the Persian King, destroyed the results achieved and maintained by the Delian League. The Greek cities in Asia were thrown back to the condition they l[illegible] in before the battle of Mycale.

4. The second article really invested the Spartans with the right to break up any confederation or alliance they might not approve of.

5. The third article reflected discredit on Athens. She abandoned Evagoras, the champion of Greek liberty in Cyprus, in order to be assured in the possession of three islands, forgetting that Cyprus had for ten years sheltered Conon, the man who shattered the Lacedæmonian sovereignty of the Aegean.

The Corinthian War lasted between 8 and 9 years—B.C. 395-387. It had been set going by Persian encouragement (Tithraustes' subsidies to Argos, Corinth and Thebes); it was brought to an end at Persian dictation.

The epoch beginning with Aegospotami (405) and ending with the Peace of Antalcidas (387) is one of the worst chapters in all the history of Greece. It bequeathed a fourfold "damnosa hereditas" to subsequent times—viz.:

1. The systematic use of mercenaries.

2. Pitiless plundering—evil examples had been set in the cruel devastation of Elis, Argolis, Acarnania, and the territory of Corinth, by the Lacedæmonians.

3. Political contentions were embittered—they had been bitter enough before, as witness the scenes in Corcyra in B.C. 427.

4. Blunted sense of national honour—the Greeks seemed to feel no shame in calling in the Persian King to arbitrate not so much between as over them.

The disgrace of the Peace of Antalcidas falls, of course, mainly upon Sparta, which henceforth was in the position of the Persian King's agent for the management and repression of Greece. That such a convention could be made shows not only the corruption of Sparta at the time, but the defects of the Lycurgean system—perhaps also of the Spartan nature. The Peace of Antalcidas was cunning work—but the cunning was that of fools, short-sighted and futile.